International Bancorp. LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco: The Supreme Court\u27s Silence Speaks Louder than Words by Fortenberry, Jason
Mississippi College Law Review 
Volume 25 
Issue 2 Vol. 25 Iss. 2 Article 5 
2006 
International Bancorp. LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du 
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco: The Supreme Court's Silence 
Speaks Louder than Words 
Jason Fortenberry 
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.law.mc.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Custom Citation 
25 Miss. C. L. Rev. 183 (2005-2006) 
This Case Note is brought to you for free and open access by MC Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Mississippi College Law Review by an authorized editor of MC Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact walter@mc.edu. 
INTERNATIONAL BANCORP, LLC v. SOCIETE DES BAINS
DE MER ET DU CERCLE DES ETRANGERS A MONACO:




In International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle
des Etrangers a Monaco,2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that gambling services offered exclusively in a foreign
country, coupled with substantial advertising in the United States, were suf-
ficient "use in commerce" to afford a foreign company trademark protec-
tion in the United States under the Lanham Act. In January of 2004, the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, thus labeling this bold
opinion as binding precedent, at least in the Fourth Circuit.
The purpose of this Note is to examine how the Fourth Circuit's rea-
soning compares to that of other courts that have addressed the issue and
to highlight the possible impact the Supreme Court's refusal to grant certi-
orari will have on the current requirements for protection of a foreign
trademark in the United States. Part II of this Note examines the underly-
ing facts of the International Bancorp case. Part III provides a brief history
of the founding principles of trademark law and the decisions of the Su-
preme Court interpreting the extent of Congress's power to regulate for-
eign commerce under the Commerce Clause. Part III also gives a concise
history of the Lanham Act and the decisions from the federal courts of
appeals and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB or the Board)
interpreting the "use in commerce" definition of the Act. Part IV details
the holdings of both the majority and the dissenting opinions in Interna-
tional Bancorp. Part V examines the harmony between the International
Bancorp holding and the decisions from the courts of appeals, and also
describes the conflict between the Fourth Circuit and decisions from the
TTAB addressing the "use in commerce" issue. Part V further analyzes
how International Bancorp nullifies the trademark registration process in
the Internet setting, how it serves to undermine the function of the TFAB
in registration proceedings, and how it brings to light the increased burden
it places on the domestic business owner.
1. The author is currently an associate at the law firm of Bradley, Arant, Rose, & White, LLP,
in Jackson, Mississippi, but completed this note prior to graduating from Mississippi College School of
Law in May 2006. The author would like to thank Professor H. Lee Hetherington for his guidance and
Professor Deborah Challener for her limitless patience and invaluable advice.
2. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329
F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003).
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II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. The Parties
1. The Appellee
Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco (SBM)
was formed in 1863 by a charter from Prince Charles III of Monaco for the
purpose of creating a casino and resort.3 SBM's business was centered on
the management of a variety of resort hotels and gambling facilities in
Monaco. The majority shareholder in the organization was the government
of Monaco.4 The holdings of SBM consisted of several service-oriented
establishments including four gambling casinos, one of which was called the
"Casino de Monte Carlo."5
In 1984, SBM began operating a New York office to promote North
American tourism. SBM's New York office was staffed by four employees
and was funded with approximately one million dollars annually to finance
trade show participation, advertising campaigns, charity partnerships, di-
rect mail solicitation, and telephone marketing.6 The New York office was
an international sales office from which American customers were able to
book reservations for SBM's resort facilities and arguably for the "Casino
de Monte Carlo" as well.7 The New York office's promotions ultimately
brought twenty-two percent of SBM's customers from North America to
Monaco.8
SBM used the mark "Casino de Monte Carlo" throughout the world
and in the United States to promote its most popular casino through vari-
ous print media, films, and the Internet, and distributed its own magazine,
Societe, which contained photographs and descriptions of the casino and
displayed the mark "Casino de Monte Carlo."9 In addition, SBM main-
tained a website that contained a link to the "Casino de Monte Carlo" in
order "to promote SBM's resort ([including its] Casino de Monte Carlo)
[online]" and to allow patrons to make reservations at the resort.1" SBM
also sponsored an "online casino [which could] be accessed by authorized
and approved gaming enthusiasts through legal and secure means."'"
In 1996, SBM registered the trademark "Casino de Monte Carlo" for
use with their most prominent casino in accordance with the trademark
3. Brief of Appellee at 6, Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des
Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1364).
4. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 192 F.
Supp. 2d 467, 471 (E.D. Va. 2002).
5. Brief of Appellant at 7-8, Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d 359.
6. Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 7-8.
7. Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 479. Appellee alleged that the bookings to the casino were
available through the New York office; however, Judge Luttig of the Fourth Circuit found the assertion
to be unsubstantiated. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 365.
8. Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 8. It was unspecified as to whether the twenty-two percent
were customers of the casino or of the resort or both. Nor did the record indicate how many customers
were from Canada and how many were from the United States.
9. Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
10. Brief of Appellee, supra note 3, at 8-9.
11. Id. at 6.
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regulations of Monaco.12 On November 7, 2001, SBM filed an application
for registration of the same trademark in the United States stating an "in-
tent to use" the mark in commerce. As of May 19, 2003, the application
had not been granted.
13
2. The Appellants
Claude Levy and his wife, Arja, were the creators, owners, and opera-
tors of five companies (the Companies) established for the purpose of de-
veloping and operating Internet websites related to the online gaming
industry. 14 The function of the Companies was to register domain names
and develop websites that provided customers with access to online gam-
bling activity. None of the Companies had employees or offices, and only
one company out of the five maintained bank accounts. 5 All of the Com-
panies purported to be separate enterprises but had "common leadership,
common goals, and work[ed] together with the common purpose" of offer-
ing websites devoted to online gambling.' 6 None of the Companies owned
and operated by the Levys "had officers, directors or members other than
[the Levys]," none were capitalized, and none observed other standard cor-
porate formalities. 7
The Companies developed more than 150 websites providing online
gambling, fifty-three of which contained domain addresses including part of
the term "Casino de Monte Carlo."' 8 In addition, the websites exhibited
pictures of the interior and exterior of the Casino de Monte Carlo, owned
and operated by SBM.' 9 The sites further made "allusion[s] to the geo-
graphic location of Monte Carlo, implying that they offer[ed] online gam-
bling as an alternative to [the Companies'] Monaco-based casino, though
12. Id.
13. Id. The Lanham Act, as amended in 1988, allows a person who has a "bona fide intention...
to use a trademark in commerce" to request registration of his mark on the Federal Trademark Regis-
ter. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b)(1) (2000).
14. Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73. The Levys' business ventures in the online gaming
market included International Bancorp, LLC and International Lotteries, LLC, both Delaware limited
liability companies; and Las Vegas Sportsbook, Inc., which was incorporated under the laws of the
Republic of Panama. The Levys' holdings also included International Services, Inc., incorporated in St.
Kitts, West Indies, which managed and registered domain names for the other companies, and Britan-
nia Finance Corp., incorporated in Delaware, which provided accounting and financial services for the
other companies. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 472.
17. Id.
18. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329
F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 2003).
19. Id. The domain names at issue were registered with Verisign, a Herndon, Virginia company
specializing in registries for .com and .net domain names. The registrations by the individual companies
were as follows: International Bancorp, LLC registered montecarlocasino.net, montecarlocasino.org,
montecarlo-casino.com, monte-carlo-casino.com, casinosmontecarlo.com, and e-montecarlocasino.com.
International Lotteries registered casino-montecarlo.com, montecarlocasinos.com, lecasinodemonte-
carlo.com, casinodemontecarlo.com, lemontecarlocasino.com, lecasinomontecarlo.com, casinomonte-
carlo-com, monte-carlocasino.com, montecarlogambling.com, c-casinomontecarlo.com, casinomonte-
carlo.org, and casinomontecarlo.net. Britannia Finance Corp. registered monacocasinos.com, monte-
carlocasinos.net, thecasinomontecarlo.com, and themontecarlocasino.com. International Services, Inc.
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they operate[d] no such facility."2 Two of the sites operated by the Com-
panies, casinomontecarlo.com and montecarlocasinos.com, invited guests
to download the Companies' software, called "Casino Monte Carlo.
21
The software greeted potential customers with a picture of the exterior of
SBM's Casino de Monte Carlo, coupled with the words, "Welcome to Ca-
sino Monte Carlo. 22 Two of the sites featured statements that appeared to
refer to SBM, such as, "[t]his casino is owned and managed by a group of
U.S. corporations, including a U.S. finance company, and an international
group of companies who have been in business for more than 140 years.
'23
The two sites further alluded to SBM by stating, "We are the only Internet
gaming company to have the double gambling license from Casino Monte
Carlo and from Las Vegas Casino. '24 Finally, both sites contained a refer-
ence to a casino location "between mountain and sea, gardens, cultural
events ... ideal for a romantic vacation, an independent state in the heart
of Europe-the Principality of Monaco, and naturally, Monte Carlo, home
of legendary casinos famous the world over. "25
While none of the Companies' websites using the domain names con-
taining some portion of the term "Casino de Monte Carlo" portrayed any
criticisms or parodies of SBM or its establishments, neither did they con-
tain any specific representation dismissing commercial affiliation with the
organization. 26 Further, "neither Levy nor any of the plaintiff companies
[held] any registered trademarks using the terms 'Casino,' 'Monaco,? or
'Monte Carlo"' in any form, whether dashed, hyphenated, or separated.
B. The World Intellectual Property Organization Arbitration and
Mediation Center
Upon learning of the Companies' use of the fifty-three domain names
that were similar to its own mark "Casino de Monte Carlo," SBM filed
complaints against each of the Companies with the World Intellectual
registered casinodemontecarlo.net, casino-montecarlo.net, casinomonte-carlo.net, casinosmonte-
carlo.org, casinosmontecarlo.net, casinosmontecarlo.org, casinomontecarloonline.com, ecasinomonte-
carlo.com, ecasinomontecarlo.net, emontecarlocasino.com, emontecarlocasino.net, e-casinomonte-
carlo.net, e.montecarlocasino.net, lemontecarlocasino.net, monte-carlocasino.net, montecarlocasino
online.com, montecarlocasinoonline.net, montecarloonlinecasino.com, montecarloonlinecasino.net,
montecarlogambling.net, montecarlogames.com, montecarlogames.net, montecarlojackpot.com, mon-
tecarlojackpot.net, sexycasinomontecarlo.com, sexymontecarlocasino.com, sexymontecarlocasino.net,
webcasinomontecarlo.com, livemonacocasino.com, monacogaming.com, and monacogaming.net. Int'l
Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 472-73, nn.9-11.
20. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 361.
21. Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 474.
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis added).
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Property Organization Arbitration and Mediation Center (WIPO) chal-
lenging the use of the domain names.28 SBM argued that by using the do-
main names containing portions of the term "Casino de Monte Carlo" for
websites directly related to the gambling industry, the Companies were cre-
ating a probability of confusion among Internet users and gambling con-
sumers as to the creator of the websites. 29 SBM further alleged that the
Companies' use of photographs and allusions to SBM's casino on the dis-
puted websites was an attempt to create a false appearance of affiliation
with SBM.
30
The WIPO panel ruled in favor of SBM, pointing out that "[i]f [SBM]
itself was confused by the photography and was led to believe that it was a
photograph of its own resort, then most Internet users would probably be
similarly falsely led to believe that it is indeed a photograph of the interior
of the Casino de Monte-Carlo. 31 Ultimately, the panel held that the Com-
panies had no rights or legitimate interests in the domain names and that
the intentional registration and use of domain names confusingly similar to
SBM's mark was an indication of a bad-faith attempt to create a false ap-
pearance of affiliation with SBM.3 2 Accordingly, the panel ordered that
ownership of the disputed domain names be transferred to SBM.33
C. The District Court
"Under WIPO procedures, the registrar of a domain name must im-
plement any transfer decision of the Panel, unless the losing registrant com-
mences court proceedings against the [original] complainant within ten
days" of the WIPO decision.34 To avoid transfer of the domain names to
SBM, the Companies brought a complaint before the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.3" The Companies sought a de-
claratory judgment that they were "entitled to retain ownership of the do-
main names in dispute. 36 In response to the complaint, SBM filed a
counterclaim against the Companies and Claude Levy, individually, assert-
ing, inter alia: "(1) unfair competition and trademark infringement in viola-
tion [of section 43(a)] of the Lanham Act, [and (2)] cybersquatting in
28. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco v. I. Bancorp Europe, Admin.
Panel Decision, No. D2000-1323, Jan. 8, 2001, available at http://arbiter.wipo.int/domains/decisions/
html/2000/d2000-1323.html. The panel issued a separate opinion for each of the suits against the indi-
vidual companies; however, because the claims and decisions were nearly identical for each, only one is






34. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 192 F.
Supp. 2d 467, 475 n.15 (E.D. Va. 2002).
35. Id. at 475.
36. Id.
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violation of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)." 3 7
Prior to trial, "the Companies and SBM filed cross motions for summary
judgment."38
1. Trademark Infringement
The court first turned to SBM's counterclaim of trademark infringe-
ment under section 43(a). The court stated that in order to prevail, SBM
must prove, inter alia, two things: (1) that it possessed a "protectable trade-
mark," and (2) that the Companies used a similar mark in a way likely to
confuse consumers.39 The court noted that lack of federal registration did
not render SBM's mark unprotectable, as federal registration is not the
only method of attaining protectable status under the Lanham Act.4"
However, the court noted that in order for its unregistered service mark41
to be protectable under the Act, SBM must show "that the mark has been
used in American commerce and that the mark is distinctive. 42 To define
the term "used in American commerce," the court turned to section 45 of
the Lanham Act.43 The court concluded that a mark is used in American
commerce "when it is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of ser-
vices and the services are rendered in commerce .... I
Determining when a service had been rendered in commerce was the
next step for the court. Finding no Fourth Circuit precedent to specifically
address the issue, the court looked to the Second Circuit as its guide."5
Since Congress had passed the Lanham Act through exercise of its broad
power under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, the court reached
37. Id. The ACPA is located in section 43(d)(1) of the Lanham Act. SBM also asserted claims
for trademark dilution under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act, unfair competition in violation of sec-
tion 44(h) of the Lanham Act, and trademark infringement under the common law of Virginia. The
court dismissed all three claims. Id. These claims are not pertinent to the subject of this Note and
warrant no further discussion.
38. Id. at 476. The court dismissed the claims against Levy due to lack of personal jurisdiction.
Under Virginia law, proof that the director of a corporation used the entity to disguise a wrong or
obscure fraud is necessary to "pierce the corporate veil." The court found that SBM failed to meet this
standard. Id. at 478.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 479.
41. A "service mark" is defined as "any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination
thereof ... used by a person ... to identify and distinguish the services of one person ... from the
services of others and to indicate the source of the services ...." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
42. Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 479. It should be noted here that distinctiveness of a mark
may be loosely defined as denoting an association in the mind of the consumer between the trademark
and the product or service it represents. See Int'l Kennel Club of Chi., Inc. v. Mighty Star, Inc., 846
F.2d 1079 (7th Cir. 1988). Marks that contain geographic terms are deemed unprotectable unless they
have acquired distinctiveness by creating a "secondary meaning" in the minds of a substantial group of
relevant consumers through extensive exposure. The district court relied on six factors created by the
Fourth Circuit to aid its determination and found the "Casino de Monte Carlo" mark to be distinctive
based on "secondary meaning." Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 482; see also Perini Corp. v. Perini
Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 125 (4th Cir. 1990) (naming six factors to be used to determine whether
"secondary meaning" exists). The determination of "secondary meaning" varies from circuit to circuit
and will not be further discussed in this Note.
43. Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
44. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
45. Id.
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the sensible conclusion that the term "commerce" under the Lanham Act
was meant to encompass all commerce that may be lawfully regulated by
Congress.46 Therefore, when a service is rendered in commerce that may
be lawfully regulated by Congress, it may be afforded protection under the
Lanham Act. The court concluded that use in American commerce re-
quired nothing more than advertising in the United States coupled with
rendering services that have an "effect on interstate commerce,"47 and that
SBM's New York operations met the requirements.48 SBM's New York
office was the hub of its advertising campaign in the United States and was
one of SBM's many international sales offices from which customers could
book reservations. "Thus, the record shows that in this respect, SBM 'ser-
vices are rendered' in the United States.
'49
The court next addressed the requirement that the Companies' mark
be used in a manner likely to cause consumer confusion. The court applied
seven factors created by the Fourth Circuit to determine whether confusion
was likely.5" The factors were: (1) the strength of the claimant's mark; (2)
the similarity between the marks; (3) the similarity between the services
offered by the parties; (4) the similarity between the facilities used by the
parties in conjunction with their services; (5) the similarity between the
parties' advertising; (6) the intent underlying the use of the alleged infring-
ing mark; and (7) the existence of actual confusion among consumers.5 1
The court found it unnecessary to address each factor, concluding that
confusion was likely "because four of the seven factors weigh[ed] heavily in
SBM's favor. '52 The determinative facts, according to the court, were that
SBM's "Casino de Monte Carlo" mark had acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning;53 that the Companies had used the term "Ca-
sino de Monte Carlo" or a "substantially similar term '54 in registering and
using the disputed domain names; that both parties offered similar gam-
bling services; and that the Companies had "intended to enhance the mar-
ketability of their services '55 by using the term to create a false affiliation
with SBM's casino.56 Consequently, the court found in favor of SBM on its
trademark infringement counterclaim under section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.
5 7
46. Id. (citing United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86,
92-93 (2d Cir. 1997)). The court apparently did not recognize that the conclusion it reached by consid-
ering precedent was already codified in section 45 of the Lanham Act, which defines commerce as "all
commerce that may be lawfully regulated by Congress." 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
47. Int'l Bancorp, 192 F. Supp. 2d at 479.
48. Id. at 479-80.
49. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
50. Id. at 482-83.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 483.
53. See supra note 42.
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2. Cybersquatting Under the ACPA
The court next addressed SBM's counterclaim for cybersquatting
under the ACPA. The court initially noted that the ACPA places liability
on a person who uses another's trademark as a domain name if that person
"(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that mark and (ii) registers, traffics
in, or uses a domain name that ... at the time of registration of the domain
name, is identical or confusingly similar to that mark."58 The court recog-
nized that the "confusingly similar" requirement under the ACPA mirrors
that of the "confusingly similar" requirement of a trademark infringement
action under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.59 The court thus deter-
mined that in order to prevail on its counterclaim, SBM must prove that
the Companies' use of the domain names "constitute[d] . . . trademark in-
fringement... and it must also demonstrate that the [Companies] have or
had a bad faith intent to profit from the use of the 'Casino de Monte Carlo'
mark."6° Because the court had already found that the Companies had
infringed on SBM's "Casino de Monte Carlo" mark, the court focused on
whether the Companies had acted with the requisite bad faith. After a
lengthy application of nine determinative factors listed in the Lanham
Act,6 the court found that "eight of the ... statutory factors support[ed]
SBM's claim that the forty-three domain names have been registered and
used in bad faith."62 The court, therefore, granted SBM's motion for sum-
mary judgment under the ACPA and ordered the Companies to transfer
the forty-three domain names at issue to SBM.63
58. Id. at 484 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A) (2000)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 484-85.
61. Id. at 485. The factors are as follows: (1) the trade mark or other intellectual property rights
of the registrant, if any, in the domain name; (2) the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise commonly used to identify that person; (3) the
person's prior use, if any, of the domain name in connection with the bona fide offering of any goods or
services; (4) the person's bona fide noncommercial or fair use of the mark in a site accessible under the
domain name; (5) the person's intent to divert consumers from the mark owner's online location to a
site accessible under the domain name that could harm the goodwill represented by the mark, either for
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark; (6) the person's offer to transfer,
sell, or otherwise assign the domain name to the mark owner or any third party for financial gain
without having used, or having intent to use, the domain name in a bona fide offering of any goods or
services or the person's prior conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (7) the person's provision of
material and misleading false contact information when applying for the registration of the domain
name, the person's intentional failure to maintain accurate contact information, or the person's prior
conduct indicating a pattern of such conduct; (8) the person's registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names that the person knows are identical or confusingly similar to the distinctive marks of
others or are dilutive of the famous marks of others; and (9) the extent to which the mark incorporated
in the domain name is distinctive and famous within the meaning of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
62. Int'l Bancorp., 192 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
63. Id. at 492. To be sure of its decision, the court addressed whether the Companies' actions
could be justified on the basis of "fair use" as provided by the ACPA. The ACPA provides that "fair
use" is a defense to infringement when "the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringe-
ment is a use, otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of the
individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device which is descriptive of and
used fairly and in good faith only to describe the goods or services of such party or their geographic
origin ... " 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2000). Noting that none of the Companies bore the name "Casino
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The Companies appealed the district court's finding of trademark in-
fringement to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.64
That court held that
(1) SBM's mark was being used in foreign trade and was
protectable;
(2) the evidence supported a finding that the mark had ac-
quired secondary meaning; and
(3) the evidence supported a finding of likely consumer
confusion.65
Accordingly, the court awarded relief to SBM.66 The United States
Supreme Court denied the Companies' Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on
January 12, 2004.67
III. BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE LAW
A. The Nature of United States Trademark Rights
Traditionally, in the United States, trademark rights have been defined
as property rights. 68 However, this property right extends to a trademark
only in that a business owner has a property right in protecting the goodwill
of his recognized business or trade and has a right to prevent others from
interfering with such established rights.69 To the extent that a trademark is
a mechanism of the goodwill and recognition of an established business or
trade, it is protected as a property interest.7" Thus, it has been said that
"the trademark is treated as merely a protection for the goodwill, and not
the subject of property except in connection with an existing business."'"
The recognition of this property right has given rise to the principle that
"wherever the trade [or business] goes, attended by the use of the mark,
the right of the trader to be protected against the sale by others of their
wares in the place of his wares will be sustained."72 This principle was first
established by a pair of United States Supreme Court cases in 1916 and
1918.
de Monte Carlo" and that none of their services originated in Monaco, the court stated that "the
[Clompanies had no reasonable ground to think that they engaged in fair use" of SBM's mark. Id. at
487.
64. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329
F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2003).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Baines de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 540
U.S. 1106 (2004).
68. Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 413 (1916).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 414.
72. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918).
2006]
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In Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf,7 3 the Supreme Court first es-
tablished the nature of trademark rights in the United States. There, a dis-
pute arose between an Ohio corporation and Hanover Star Milling, an
Illinois corporation, both of which manufactured, marketed, and sold flour
under the "Tea Rose" trademark.74 The Ohio corporation began manufac-
turing and selling flour under the mark in 1872 and had confined its adver-
tising and sales to states north of the Ohio river.75 In 1885, Hanover began
manufacturing and selling flour under the mark but confined its activity to
southern states, most notably Alabama.76 Both parties had established suc-
cessful businesses in their respective areas and realized substantial profits,
although neither had obtained federal registration of the mark.77 The Ohio
corporation challenged Hanover's later use of the "Tea Rose" mark, assert-
ing that its own right to use the mark was "not limited to any place, city, or
state, and, therefore, must be deemed to extend everywhere."78 The Su-
preme Court rejected the argument and emphasized that the Ohio corpora-
tion's first use of the mark in northern states did not secure nationwide
rights in the mark because rights in "the mark ... itself[ ] cannot travel to
markets where there is no article to wear the badge and no trader to offer
the article. '79 Further, the Court noted that it is the trade accompanying a
mark that is protected rather than the actual mark itself.80 Because the
Ohio Corporation had never extended its business activities into the south-
ern states, the Court held that its first use of the mark in the northern
territory would not abolish Hanover's goodwill established in the South, as
it would lead to "the complete perversion of the proper theory of trade-
mark rights."81
Two years later, the Supreme Court discussed the nature of trademark
rights in a dispute between two mark owners whose geographic trade areas
overlapped in Kentucky. In United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co.,82
the Court was asked to settle the issue of trademark ownership where the
owner of a federally registered trademark sought to enjoin the use of the
same mark by an unregistered user.83 In 1877, United Drug Company be-
gan manufacturing and distributing a dyspepsia medication throughout
Massachusetts under the mark "Rex. ' 84 In 1883, the Theodore Rectanus
73. Hanover, 240 U.S. 403.
74. Id. at 405-06.
75. Id. at 406-12.
76. Id. at 410.
77. Id. at 408-10. The Ohio Corporation had realized profits of approximately $5000 over the
five years preceding the suit, and Hanover's profits from its business in the southern states amassed
profits of over $150,000 a year. Id.
78. Id. at 416-17 (quoting Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U.S. 617, 619 (1879)).
79. Id. at 416 (quoting Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Allen & Wheeler Co., 208 F. 513, 519 (7th
Cir. 1913)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 420.
82. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90 (1918).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 94.
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Company began manufacturing and distributing a blood purifier in Louis-
ville, Kentucky under the same "Rex" mark.85 In 1900, United Drug se-
cured federal registration of its mark and subsequently expanded its
business into Kentucky, at which time it sought to enjoin Rectanus's use of
the "Rex" mark.86 Faced with two users of the same mark on similar prod-
ucts in the same geographic area, the Court reiterated its established rule
that "[t]here is no such thing as property in a trade-mark except as a right
appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with which
the mark is employed."87 Therefore, in the eyes of the Court, the determi-
native question was that of first use sufficient to establish a recognized bus-
iness or trade in Kentucky.88 Although United Drug had registered the
mark, the Court noted that the registration "confer[red] no monopoly"89 in
the mark and that Rectanus's first use in Kentucky through manufacture
and sale was the determinative factor, as the "right to a [trademark] grows
out of its use ... and it is not the subject of property except in connection
with an existing business."90 The Court reasoned that Rectanus's first use
of the mark in Kentucky had established a recognized goodwill in its busi-
ness and therefore had guaranteed its right to employ the mark there.91 In
accordance with the notion that a trademark is "merely a convenient
means for facilitating the protection of one's good-will in trade . .. ,"" the
Court allowed the concurrent uses of the mark, but ordered Rectanus's
continued use to be confined to Kentucky and ordered United Drug not to
enter Kentucky with its mark.93
B. The Lanham Act and the "Use in Commerce" Requirement
In 1946, Congress extended its broad power under the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution to pass the Lanham Act.94 The
purpose of the Act was to "protect the public from deceit, to foster fair
competition, and to secure to the business community the advantages of
reputation and good will"95 by simplifying the trademark registration pro-
cess and ending judicial vagueness with respect to relief from trademark
infringement.96 Keeping with the founding trademark principles created by
the Supreme Court in United Drug and Hanover, Congress recognized that
trademark ownership "confers no monopoly" of rights in the owner, but
"only gives the right to prohibit [another's use of the mark] so far as to
85. Id.
86. Id. at 94-95.
87. Id. at 97 (citing Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 414 (1916)).
88. Id. at 100.
89. Id. at 98.
90. Id. at 97 (citing Hanover, 240 U.S. at 413-14).
91. Id. at 103.
92. Id. at 98.
93. ld. at 103.
94. S. REP. No. 79-1333 (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1274, 1277. The Lanham Act is
found in 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1141 (2000).
95. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1275.
96. Id. at 1274.
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protect the owner's good will against the sale of another's product as his."'97
Recognizing that "trade is no longer local, but ... national, ' 98 Congress
sought to broaden the United Drug/Hanover principle while preserving its
essence by requiring any party seeking protection under the Act to show
that he had established a protectable interest in a mark through use of the
mark in commerce. 99 As a result, only "[t]he owner of a trademark used in
commerce may request registration of its trademark .. 1.0 under the Lan-
ham Act.101
In addition to providing guidelines for trademark registration and af-
fording remedies for trademark infringement, the Act included section
43(a), which gives the holder of an unregistered mark access to the federal
court system in the event his mark is infringed upon by another.10 2 Noting
that protection of unregistered marks traditionally had been a matter of
state unfair competition laws, Congress explained its inclusion in the Act
by stating, "There is no essential difference between trade-mark infringe-
ment and what is loosely called unfair competition .... All trade-mark
cases are cases of unfair competition and involve the same legal wrong."'1 3
Revisions to the Lanham Act in 1988 emphasized that section 43(a)
"applies only to acts or practices which occur in affect [sic] commerce. "104
Therefore, Section 43(a), as revised, provides:
(a)(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any
goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in com-
merce any word, term, name, symbol, or device or any com-
bination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or
misleading description of fact, or false or misleading repre-
sentation of fact which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or
to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of
such person with another person, or as to the origin, spon-
sorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or com-
mercial activities by another person .... 105
97. Id. at 1275.
98. Id. at 1277.
99. See id. at 1275-77.
100. "The owner of a trademark used in commerce may request registration of its trademark on
the principle register ... [by] filing in the Patent and Trademark Office an application" for registration.
15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (2000).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(1) (emphasis added).
102. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000) (emphasis added).
103. 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1275.
104. S. REP. No. 100-515 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5577, 5603.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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Under section 43(a), an unregistered mark seemingly must satisfy the "uses
in commerce" requirement demanded of a registered mark before it will be
afforded protection under the Act.
10 6
"Use in commerce" under the Lanham Act is defined as:
[T]he bona fide use of a mark in the ordinary course of
trade, and not made merely to reserve a right in a mark.
For purposes of this Act, a mark shall be deemed to be in
use in commerce-
(1) on goods when-
(A) it is placed in any manner on the goods or
their containers or the displays associated there-
with or on the tags or labels affixed thereto...
and
(B) the goods are sold or transported in com-
merce, and
(2) on services when it is used or displayed in the sale
or advertising of services and the services are rendered
in commerce.... 7
Thus, the "use in commerce" requirement is satisfied for marks used in
connection with goods when the mark is attached to the goods in some
",108manner and when "the goods are sold or transported in commerce ....
The requirement is satisfied for marks used in connection with services
("service marks") when the mark is used in advertising and when the ser-
vices are rendered in commerce.' 0 9 "Commerce" is defined broadly under
the Act as "all commerce which may lawfully be regulated by Congress."'110
C. Congressional Authority to Regulate Foreign Commerce
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution grants to Con-
gress the power to lawfully regulate "Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with Indian Tribes.""' The scope of this
regulatory power, as it relates to commerce outside the boundaries of the
United States, was decided in several early Supreme Court decisions.
106. This Note focuses on the interpretation of the "use in commerce" requirement as applied to
foreign entities seeking protection under United States law. It has been noted by at least one trade-
mark scholar that this provision of the Act, read literally, does not require the party seeking protection
(whether foreign or domestic) to actually use its mark in commerce, but only to show that the alleged
infringing party has used a confusingly similar mark in commerce. See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCAR-
THY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 29:4 (4th ed. 2000). While the distinction may have
consequences as to the scope of protection for unregistered marks in general, the discussion is outside
the scope of this Note.




111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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The Court first defined the scope of this power in Gibbons v.
Ogden.'1 2 There, the Court declared a New York statute granting exclusive
rights to two individuals to use steam navigation on all the waters of New
York as "repugnant to that clause of the constitution of the United States,
which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce ....113 In doing so, the
Court sought to clarify the scope of the term "commerce" and rejected the
notion that the term is limited to "traffic, buying and selling or the in-
terchange of commodities." '114 Instead, the Court stated that "[c]ommerce,
undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is intercourse. It de-
scribes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations,
in all its branches .... ""' The Court went a step further and declared that
this broad definition of commerce extends to commerce with foreign na-
tions as well as commerce among the several states and with the Indian
tribes." 6 Thus, Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce extends to
''every species of commercial intercourse between the United States and
foreign nations. No sort of trade can be carried on between this country
and any other, to which this power does not extend.""11
7
In Henderson v. Mayor of the City of New York," 8 the Supreme Court
added to the law defining the scope of congressional power to regulate
foreign commerce. The Court had to determine the constitutionality of a
New York statute requiring documented personal histories of any foreign
ship's passengers entering the port of New York." 9 Striking down the stat-
ute as an interference with congressional power, the Court stated that "[a]
law or rule emanating from any lawful authority, which prescribes terms or
conditions on which alone the vessel can discharge its passengers, is a regu-
lation of commerce; and, in case of vessels and passengers coming from
foreign ports, [is] a regulation of commerce with foreign nations."'' 0 The
Court boldly emphasized that Congress's regulatory power under the Com-
merce Clause includes the power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions, which most certainly encompasses "commerce between citizens of
the United States and citizens or subjects of foreign governments.' 2 1 The
Court left no room for confusion as to Congress's plenary power over for-
eign commerce when it concluded that "[the] whole subject [of regulating
112. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
113. Id. at 1.
114. Id. at 189.
115. Id. at 189-90.
116. Id. at 193.
117. Id. at 193-94.
118. Henderson v. Mayor of the City of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259 (1875).
119. Id. at 265. The owners of a steamship from Great Britain challenged a New York statute that
required the master of every vessel entering the port of New York from a foreign port to provide the
Mayor of New York with a written record of the name, birthplace, last residence, and occupation of
every passenger who was not a citizen of the United States and to give a bond for every passenger so
reported. Id. at 261. Penalties for noncompliance included a charge to the ship's owner of $500 for
every such passenger. Id. Henderson challenged the validity of the statute and the claim was dismissed
by the lower court. Id.
120. Id. at 271.
121. Id. at 270 (quoting United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407 (1865)).
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foreign commerce] has been confided to Congress by the Constitution ....
[A] serious question, which has long been a matter of contest and com-
plaint, may [now] effectually and satisfactorily be settled.
122
In United States v. Holliday,23 the Supreme Court refused to confine
Congress's commerce power to United States territory and declared that
such authority exists regardless of where commerce occurs. The Court
heard arguments concerning the constitutionality of a congressional act
prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians. 2 4 The act was challenged by a
citizen convicted of such a sale on the grounds that the sale did not take
place on an Indian reservation and was purely a matter of state considera-
tion, and, therefore, Congress had no constitutional authority to pass such
legislation.125 The Court rejected the argument, stating that "commerce
with the Indian tribes[ ] means commerce with the individuals composing
those tribes. The act before us describes this precise kind of traffic or com-
merce, and, therefore, comes within [Congress's regulatory power]."'
1 26
Further, the Court noted that Congress's power "does not stop at the juris-
dictional [lines] .... If Congress has power to regulate [commerce], that
power must be exercised wherever the subject exists.' 1 27 Ultimately, the
Court upheld the act on the reasoning that "[t]he locality of the [com-
merce] can have nothing to do with the power. "128
In In re Trademark Cases,129 the Supreme Court decided that the sub-
ject of trademarks falls within the ambit of Congress's power under the
Commerce Clause. The case involved criminal prosecutions of three de-
fendants for violations of trademark legislation passed by Congress. 3 ° The
Court was petitioned to settle the question of whether the legislation was
founded on valid constitutional authority.' 3 ' The Court reasoned that the
term commerce "comprehends intercourse for the purposes of trade in any
and all its forms, including transportation, purchase, sale, and exchange of
commodities, between the citizens of our country and the citizens or sub-
jects of other countries, and between the citizens of different States.,
13 2
The Court believed that since the realm of commerce encompassed the
purchase and sale of commodities, Congress's power over such commerce
included "all the instruments, aids, and appliances" which accompany such
122. Id. at 274.
123. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407.
124. Id. at 408. The Judiciary Act of 1789 declared that any person who sold liquors to "any
Indian superintendent or Indian agent appointed by the United States" shall be fined and imprisoned.
Id.
125. Id. at 408-09.
126. Id. at 417.
127. Id. at 417-18 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 1 (1824)).
128. Id. at 418.
129. In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
130. Id. at 91. More specifically, the case involved the indictments of three defendants who were
-each charged with violations of congressional legislation prohibiting knowing and willful possession "of
counterfeits and colorable imitations of trademarks," knowing and willful selling of counterfeits, and
attaching colorable imitations of established trademarks to goods sold for profit. Id. at 82-83.
131. Id. at 91-92.
132. Id. at 86.
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purchases and sales. 133 The Court further noted that trademarks are "im-
portant instrumentalities ... by which trade, especially in modern times, is
conducted [as] [tihey are the means by which manufacturers and merchants
identify their [wares]. ' 134 Accordingly, Congress's power under the Com-
merce Clause extends to all places where there is a market for goods sold
using devices such as trademarks.
1 35
In Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,136 the Court declared
that Congress's power over foreign commerce would not be limited due to
state concerns; such a restriction, the Court reasoned, would impair federal
uniformity. 137 The case involved the constitutionality of a California tax
imposed on a Japanese importer who engaged exclusively in transportation
of cargo in foreign commerce and was exempt from federal taxes due to a
treaty. 38 The Court refused to recognize the tax as a valid exercise of state
police power.139 Considerations of federalism possibly restrict Congress's
power to regulate interstate commerce, but the Court noted that "it has
never been suggested that Congress's power to regulate foreign commerce
could be so limited."'4n Further, the Court opined that "a state tax on the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an
area where federal uniformity is essential."'' According to the Court, it
was imperative that "[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign
intercourse and trade the people of the United States act through a single
government with unified and adequate national power."' 42 Accordingly,
the Court struck down the tax as unconstitutional. 143
Thus, the Supreme Court firmly established the scope of Congress's
power to regulate matters of foreign commerce, even when such commerce
occurs on foreign soil. The Court has also made clear that the subject of
trademarks falls within Congress's regulatory power. The Lanham Act's
"use in commerce" definition for trademarks used with goods and services
was apparently meant to encompass foreign commerce between the United
States and foreign entities, no matter where such commerce occurs, as such
commerce is that which may be lawfully regulated by Congress.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 87.
135. Id. at 89.
136. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
137. Id. at 453-54.
138. Id. at 444-53. The Japanese importer operated vessels that were registered in Japan, had
their home ports there, and were subject to property tax in Japan. Id. at 437. The containers trans-
ported by the importer were frequently stored in California ports and were sometimes transported to
different ports there, although none of the cargo ever entered the stream of commerce in the state of
California. Id.
139. Id. at 447-48.
140. Id. at 449 n.13 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 448.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 454.
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D. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board's Interpretation of
"Use in Commerce"
The TTAB was created in 1958 to serve as the administrative tribunal
charged with resolving contests of trademark ownership that often arise in
registration proceedings. 1" In 1968, the TTAB was first presented with an
opportunity to apply the Lanham Act's definition of "use in commerce" as
it relates to foreign service mark holders in Sterling Drug Inc. v. Knoll A. -
G. Chemische Fabriken.145 There, a German pharmaceutical company
sought United States registration under the Lanham Act of the name "Ta-
lusin" for heart medication based on activity beginning in January 1964.
The German company's activities consisted of advertising in a German
medical publication with minimal United States distribution, occasionally
distributing to an American subsidiary, and issuing prescriptions to Ameri-
can citizens in a United States-controlled sector of West Berlin. 146 The
application raised opposition from an American drug manufacturer that
alleged that its registration in May of 1964 of the similar mark "Talwin"
preempted the German company's right to registration.
47
The Board initially noted that even though the German applicant was
the first user of its mark, the determinative question was whether such use
amounted to "use in commerce" sufficient to award registration under the
Lanham Act.148 According to the Board, "[p]riority of right in a trademark
in the United States depend[s] on priority of use in the United States and
[is] not affected by priority of use in a foreign country. ' 149 Pointing out
that "[t]he Lanham Act gives no indication of the effort to which Congress
intended to exercise its power to control commerce," the Board reasoned
that such power would not extend over a German doctor who prescribed
drugs to Americans abroad.150 Nor would that power extend, according to
the Board, to shipments of the drug to a United States subsidiary, as those
shipments were not intended to reach "relevant purchasers or prospective
purchasers" in the United States.151 The Board concluded that the Ameri-
can drug manufacturer's registration gave it superior rights over the Ger-
man applicant, whose activities "ha[d] no substantial effect, if any at all, on
the foreign commerce of the United States.'
'1 52
The TTAB had an opportunity to decide what activity equals "use in
commerce" sufficient to create United States trademark rights for a foreign
144. J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETION § 20:2 (4th
ed. 2000). These contests arise as a result of § 1063 of the Lanham Act, which provides that "[any
person who believes that he would be damaged by [another's] registration of a mark upon the principal
register may ... file an opposition [to the registration] in the Patent and Trademark Office .... " 15
U.S.C. § 1063 (2000).
145. Sterling Drug Inc. v. Knoll A.-G. Chemische Fabriken, 159 U.S.P.Q. 628 (1968).
146. Id. at 630.
147. Id. at 629.
148. Id. at 630.
149. Id.
150. Id at 630-31.
151. Id. at 631.
152. Id.
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mark used with goods in Oland's Breweries v. Miller Brewing Co.'53 A
Canadian brewery, Oland's, sought to protect its interest in the mark
"SCHOONER" for beer b;' opposing Miller Brewing's application for re-
gistration of the same mark for beer sold in the United States.154 Oland's
had sold no beer under the mark in the United States for two years prior to
Miller's application but alleged that consistent advertising of its product
bearing the mark-both in Canadian magazines distributed throughout the
northeastern United States and radio commercials broadcast throughout
the same area-prior to Miller's application was sufficient "use in com-
merce" to give it protectable rights in the mark and to cancel Miller's
request.
1 55
In response to Oland's assertion, the Board established that "[r]ights
in... a trademark... in this country are created by... 'use in commerce'
which may be lawfully regulated by Congress."' 56 The Board noted that
the lack of beer sales in the United States for more than two years was
proof that Oland's had "not sold any beer under the mark.., in commerce
which may be lawfully regulated by Congress." '57 This narrowed the issue
to whether Oland's advertising efforts alone would fulfill the requirement.
The Board determined that such "[u]se and/or promotion of a mark ... is
immaterial to... ownership ... thereof in the United States,' 58 as activity
outside the United States does little to create rights in the United States.'59
Without addressing the fact that the radio advertisements originated in the
United States, 60 the Board concluded that Oland's had not met the "use in
commerce" requirement and, therefore, could not thwart Miller's registra-
tion of the name "SCHOONER" by asserting prior rights in the mark.
16
153. Oland's Breweries v. Miller Brewing Co., 189 U.S.P.Q. 481 (1976).
154. Id. at 482. Oland's had acquired United States registration of its mark in 1961 based on its
distribution and sale of "SCHOONER" beer in the United States. Id. However, economic concerns
forced Oland's to cease sales in the United States in 1967. All rights in the mark in the United States,
therefore, were deemed "abandoned." Id. See infra note 171.
155. Oland's, 189 U.S.P.Q. at 487.
156. Id. at 483 n.2.
157. Id. at 488. At no time did Oland's allege, nor did the Board acknowledge, that beer sales to
United States citizens in Canada may equal foreign commerce.
158. Id. at 483 n.2.
159. Id. See also Stagecoach Properties, Inc. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 341, 349 (1978)
(holding that services rendered solely in a foreign country, unaccompanied by advertising in the United
States bearing the disputed trademark, did not give rise to "use in commerce," because "activity outside
of the United States is ineffective to create rights in marks within the United States.").
160. Although the Board cited no provisions of the Lanham Act in its opinion, its failure to ad-
dress the origin of the radio advertisement presumably stems from the clear language of the Act.
Under the Act, mere advertising plays no role in determining "use in commerce," as the language
requires that the mark be affixed to the goods sold or transported in commerce. See supra text accom-
panying note 107.
161. Oland's, 189 U.S.P.Q. at 488-89. The Board denied Miller's registration, however, on the
ground that Oland's advertising activities showed its intent not to abandon its previously registered
mark and, therefore, rendered the lack of beer sales in the United States "excusable nonuse" of the
mark. Id. See infra note 171.
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In 1983, the Board again was asked to determine the existence of qual-
ifying "use in commerce" by a foreign service-mark holder in Mother's Res-
taurants Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc.162  There, the TTAB was
confronted with a Canadian restaurateur seeking to establish rights in his
mark "Mother's Pizza Parlour" over those of an American company that
employed the mark "Mother's Other Kitchen" for restaurant services in
the same geographical area. 163 The Canadian owner argued that his adver-
tisements on Canadian radio stations that reached into the United States
coupled with proof that American citizens regularly dined at his Canadian-
based restaurant served to create goodwill for his business in the United
States market, which predated any activity by the American company.
164
The Canadian owner further argued that such activity established him as
the first to use the mark in commerce and thus gave him rights superior to
those of the American company.165
The Board rested its analysis on the advertising activity of the Cana-
dian mark holder and reasoned that "prior use and advertising of a mark in
connection with goods or services marketed in a foreign country.., creates
no priority rights in said mark in the United States .... " The Board
made no mention of the fact that American citizens dined at the foreign
establishment but rather concluded that the Canadian owner's promotional
activities in Canada did nothing to create rights in his mark over "one who
... has adopted the same or similar mark for the same or similar goods or
services in the United States .... ",167 Accordingly, the Board held that the
Canadian mark holder could be afforded no rights on the grounds
asserted.
168
162. Mother's Rests. Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 1046 (1983).
163. Id. at 1047. The Canadian mark owner had registered his mark in the United States in May
of 1976. The American filed for registration of his mark in October of the same year. Learning of the
American company's use of a similar mark, the Canadian owner brought suit opposing the American
company's registration. In an effort to establish rights over the Canadian mark holder, the American
company challenged the activity of the Canadian prior to his registration and asserted that such activity
did not amount to the required "use in commerce." The American company's goal was to show that it
had in fact established "use in commerce" first, thus giving it superior rights in the mark. The burden
then rested on the Canadian restaurateur to prove that his activities in the United States were sufficient
to support his registration. Id.
164. Id. at 1047-48.
165. Id. at 1048.
166. Id.
167. Id. See also Techex, Ltd. v. Dvorkovitz, 220 U.S.P.Q. 81, 83 (1983) (holding that purchase of
goods in the United States for redistribution abroad by a foreign entity, unaccompanied by advertising
in the United States, is insufficient "use in commerce" because "prior use and advertising of a trade
name in connection with a business in a foreign country creates no priority right in... the United States
168. Mother's Rests., 218 U.S.P.Q. at 1048. Arguably, the Board had no need to address the issue
of qualifying "use in commerce." The Board could have just relied on the Canadian company's regis-
tration, which it did anyway after it found that the Canadian company's claim of prior use would not
stand. Id. at 1048-50. The Board found that the registration provided the Canadian company with
rights superior to those of the American company. Id. Thus, the Board upheld the opposition and
denied the American company's registration application on the grounds that granting such registration
would give rise to consumer confusion. Id. at 1049-50.
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The TTAB most recently tackled the issue of qualifying "use in com-
merce" for a foreign service mark holder in Linville v. Rivard.'69 In Lin-
ville, the Board addressed a domestic petitioner's request to cancel a
trademark registration previously issued to a Canadian beauty salon owner
where both parties employed the mark "Ultracuts" in connection with their
hairdressing services. 170  The petitioner alleged that the foreign salon
owner had not operated a salon within the United States for five years
since the registration and, thus, had abandoned the mark.171 In response,
the Canadian mark owner offered evidence that he had continuously oper-
ated salons in Canada which serviced American citizens and that such ser-
vices resulted in profits exceeding $25,000 annually from the United
States. 72 The Canadian mark owner further argued that advertisements
originating from Canadian radio stations and newspapers, combined with
services rendered to American citizens, gave rise to use in foreign com-
merce that could be lawfully regulated by Congress.1 73
The Board rejected the arguments and made sure to indicate that
while the "use in commerce" definition in the Act necessarily recognizes
advertising of services, "the definition continues with the requirement that
the services are rendered in commerce, or ... in the United States and a
foreign country ... 174 The Board read the definition as a mandate that
services must, to some degree, be rendered in the United States. 175 Thus
the Board dismissed the assertion that American citizens traveling to Ca-
nada to patronize the Canadian salons established foreign commerce. 176
The Board concluded, as it had before, that "activity outside of the United
States is ineffective to create rights in marks within the United States, '177
and cancelled the Canadian mark holder's registration.178
As shown, the body of law from the TTAB indicates that the Board's
interpretation of qualifying "use in commerce" for a foreign trademark
holder has evolved into one requiring a foreign mark holder to sell his
goods or render his services in the United States.
169. Linville v. Rivard, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1508 (1993).
170. Id. at 1509. The Canadian salon owner had been issued a registration for his mark based on
section 44(e) of the Lanham Act. Id. Section 44(e) allows a foreign mark that is duly registered in its
country of origin to be registered in the United States regardless of whether it is used in commerce. 15
U.S.C. § 1126(e) (2000). The applicant must, however, state an "intention to use the mark in com-
merce" and failure to achieve such use may result in loss of the registration. Id.
171. Linville, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1509. When the owner of a mark previously registered in the
United States ceases to employ the mark in advertising or sale of his goods or services or when the
mark ceases to be "used in commerce," then it may be deemed abandoned. Id. The definition of
abandonment provides that "nonuse for three consecutive years shall be prima facie evidence of aban-
donment." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
172. Linville, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1511.
173. Id.




178. Id. at 1514.
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E. The Federal Courts of Appeals' Interpretations of
"Use in Commerce"
Like the TTAB, several United States Courts of Appeals have had
opportunities to apply the "use in commerce" requirement with respect to
a foreign mark holder seeking United States trademark protection. The
Federal Circuit was first confronted with the task of applying the require-
ment to a foreign mark used with goods in Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip
Morris, Inc.'79 That case involved a petition by an American cigarette
manufacturer to cancel a British competitor's registration for the trade-
mark "JPS" used to identify cigarettes.18 0 The petitioner alleged that the
foreign mark owner's failure to sell cigarettes in the United States under
the mark for two consecutive years after issuance of the registration consti-
tuted abandonment of its rights in the mark. 181 In response, the British
manufacturer asserted that during the disputed period it had implemented
a United States marketing effort aimed at distributing "'incidental' prod-
ucts such as whisky, pens, watches, sunglasses and food under the JPS
mark" and asserted that this campaign was sufficient "use in commerce" to
maintain its rights to the mark in the United States."8 2
The court first established that a foreign trademark "is not entitled to
either initial or continued registration where the statutory requirements for
registration cannot be met. ' 18 3 Therefore, just as a mark must be used in
commerce to attain registration, such "use in commerce" must be found to
maintain the registration.' 8 4 The term "use," the court noted, "mean[s] use
... in the United States." ' 5 Based on this premise, the court refused to
find that the foreign mark holder's incidental marketing campaign satisfied
the "use in commerce" requirement as it was not a viable effort to satisfy
the requirements of the Act and, seemingly, was "not for the purpose of
introducing cigarettes into the United States ..".1."6 Accordingly, the
court found cancellation of the foreign mark holder's registration
appropriate.1
8 7
Less than two weeks after its decision in Imperial Tobacco, the Federal
Circuit was again confronted with the "use in commerce" issue for a for-
eign mark used with goods in Person's Co. v. Christman.a8 This time, the
dispute before the court involved Person's, a Japanese seller of clothing,
seeking to establish trademark rights over a United States manufacturer of
sportswear where both parties employed the mark "Person's" in the sale of
179. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
180. Id. at 1577. The foreign mark at issue here was issued registration under section 44(e) of the
Lanham Act. See supra note 170.
181. Id. See supra note 171.
182. Id. at 1582.
183. Id. at 1580 (emphasis in original).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1579.
186. Id. at 1582.
187. Id. at 1583.
188. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565 (1990).
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their products.' 89 As grounds for its claim of rights, Person's argued that
its prior marketing and distribution efforts, made solely in Japan, estab-
lished its goodwill in the United States superior to that of the American
manufacturer, and therefore such activities gave it protectable rights in the
mark. 90
The court noted that the founding trademark principle set forth by the
Supreme Court in United Drug was that a trademark's "function is simply
to designate the goods [or services] as the product of a particular trader
and to protect his good will against the sale of another's product as his
.... "191 Therefore, Person's activities focused solely in Japan did nothing
to establish its business or product line in the United States since "[s]uch
foreign use has no effect on U.S. commerce" and cannot serve as a basis for
creating goodwill in the United States.192 Because "[t]rademark rights
under the Lanham Act arise solely out of use of the mark in U.S. com-
merce," 193 the court concluded that Person's had not shown that its rights
to the mark were superior to those of the American manufacturer. 94
The most recent decision prior to International Bancorp addressing
whether a foreign service mark holder had engaged in "use in commerce"
sufficient to warrant United States trademark protection came from the
Second Circuit in 1998. In Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 195 the Second Circuit was
asked to decide whether an Italian restaurateur had established protectable
trademark rights in the United States over Buti, an American restaurant
owner, where both parties employed the mark "Fashion Cafe" in conjunc-
tion with their restaurant services.' 96 As support for his claim of protect-
able trademark rights, the Italian owner argued that his advertising efforts
189. Id. at 1567-68. In 1977, Person's began applying its mark to clothing manufactured and dis-
tributed solely in Japan. Id. at 1566. In 1981, Christman traveled to Japan where he noticed the mark
and subsequently applied the mark to his sportswear line in the United States. Id. at 1567. Christman
was issued federal registration for the mark in 1984. Id. In 1982, Person's expanded its business into
the United States and in 1985 was issued registration for the mark at issue. Id. The dispute arose when
Person's filed suit against Christman alleging trademark infringement, to which Christman responded
with a counterclaim to cancel Person's registration on the ground that Christman had first used the
mark in the United States and had prior rights there. Id. Person's then attempted to establish priority
over Christman by alleging that its use of the mark in Japan afforded it rights in the United States
because it equaled "use in commerce." Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1571 (quoting United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918).
192. Id. at 1568.
193. Id. at 1570.
194. Id. at 1572. See also CBS, Inc. v. Logical Games, 719 F.2d 1237, 1239 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding
that the importation into the United States of products manufactured and sold solely in Hungary does
not give rise to protectable rights in the United States because "use in foreign countries does not create
protectable trademark rights in the United States"); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara, 754 F.2d 591, 599
(5th Cir. 1985) (holding that exclusive foreign manufacture and sale of products does not figure into
trademark analysis because "[iut is well settled that foreign use is ineffectual to create trademark rights
in the United States") (citation omitted).
195. Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L., 139 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 1998).
196. Id. at 100-01. In 1987, the Italian owner opened a restaurant in Italy under the mark "Fash-
ion Cafe." Id. at 100. During 1987-1994, the Italian owner made various trips to New York during
which he met with a well-known restaurateur to discuss the possibility of opening a restaurant under
the same name in New York. Id. During those trips, he often distributed incidental items bearing the
"Fashion Cafe" mark at various fashion shows. Id. In 1993, Buti opened his restaurant in Miami Beach
FOREIGN COMPANY TRADEMARK PROTECTION
in New York, which consisted of "distributing literally thousands of T-
shirts, cards, and key chains" bearing the "Fashion Cafe" mark prior to
Buti's use of the mark, amounted to sufficient "use in commerce" to grant
him superior rights in the mark.197 The Italian owner, however, conceded
that his restaurant services, offered solely in Italy, formed no part of for-
eign trade between Italy and the United States, as no American citizens
had ever dined at his restaurant. 198
The court noted that protection under the Act is afforded to a service
mark only when it "is used or displayed in the sale or advertising of ser-
vices and the services are rendered in commerce."1 99 Because of the Italian
owner's concession, the issue was narrowed to whether promotional activi-
ties in the United States alone could give rise to protectable rights in the
United States.20 The court reasoned that the "use in commerce" defini-
tion "reserves ... trademark protection to those foreign companies whose
actual 'trade goes, attended by the use of [its] mark,' into ... foreign com-
merce."20 1 Therefore, the Act's provisions were left unsatisfied by "mere
advertising or promotion of a mark in the United States ... where that
advertising or promotion [was] unaccompanied by any actual rendering [of
services] ... in [foreign commerce]."2 2 Accordingly, the court refused to
award rights in the trademark to the Italian restaurateur.20 3
Thus, the United States Courts of Appeals' applications of the "use in
commerce" requirement apparently has led them to conclude that activity
confined solely to a foreign country or mere advertising in the United
States is insufficient "use in commerce" to award trademark rights to a
foreign mark holder under United States law.
IV. THE INSTANT CASE
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit, International Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle
des Etrangers a Monaco came before Judges Luttig, Niemeyer, and
Motz. 2°4 Judge Luttig wrote the majority opinion, in which Judge
Niemeyer joined, and Judge Motz wrote the dissenting opinion.20 5
under the same "Fashion Cafe" mark and subsequently filed an application to register the mark with
the Patent and Trademark Office. Id. Buti planned to expand his operations into New York and upon
learning of the planned expansion, the Italian owner filed his own application for registration in the
United States. Id.. In response, Buti filed a claim contesting the Italian owner's registration and assert-
ing that he had no protectable rights in the mark. Id. at 101. The Italian owner counterclaimed, alleg-
ing that he had established prior rights in the mark and that Buti's use constituted trademark
infringement under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 103.
199. Id. at 105 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)) (emphasis in original).
200. Id. at 103.
201. Id. at 105 (quoting United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 98 (1918)).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 107.
204. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329
F.3d 359, 361 (4th Cir. 2003).
205. Id.
20061
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A. The Majority Opinion
The Companies challenged the district court's finding that their use of
the domain names constituted trademark infringement principally under
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act."° The court began by noting, as had the
district court, that a claim of trademark infringement for an unregistered
mark requires a claimant to show (1) that he has a protectable interest in a
mark, and (2) that a defendant used a similar mark in a manner likely to
confuse consumers. 0 7 The Companies claimed that SBM lacked a protect-
able interest in the "Casino de Monte Carlo" service mark and, therefore,
could not allege trademark infringement of a mark in which it had no
rights.20 8 Both parties agreed with the district court's determination that
for an unregistered service mark to be protectable under federal law it
must be "'in use in commerce' ... and it must be distinctive. 20 9 The Com-
panies, however, took issue with the lower court's determination that SBM
had met these two requirements, and, more specifically, took issue with the
finding that SBM had effectively used its mark in commerce.210
The court first defined the meaning of the crucial phrase "use in com-
merce."211 It turned to the Lanham Act for guidance and determined that
the "critical question in assessing whether SBM 'used its mark in com-
merce' is whether the services SBM provided under the . . . mark were
rendered in commerce. ' 21 2 To determine whether the services were ren-
dered in commerce, the court needed first to determine the reach of the
term "commerce" as employed in the Lanham Act. It noted that "com-
merce" as defined under the Act is "all commerce which may be lawfully
regulated by Congress. ' 213 Therefore, it looked to the United States Con-
stitution to flesh out its meaning. It concluded, as had the district court,
that because Congress extended its Commerce Clause power to pass the
Lanham Act, the reach of the term "commerce" under the Act was
206. Id. at 363.
207. Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2000); Lone Star Steakhouse & Saloon, Inc. v. Alpha of Va.,
Inc., 43 F.3d 922, 930 (4th Cir. 1995)).
208. Id.
209. Id. (citing Larsen v. Terk Techs. Corp., 151 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 1998)).
210. Id. The Companies also asserted that the "Casino de Monte Carlo" mark lacked distinctive-
ness because it was merely geographically descriptive. Id. at 370. The Fourth Circuit upheld the district
court's finding of distinctiveness based on two different theories. Id. at 370-71. The court first deter-
mined that the application of the Perini factors indicated that the mark had acquired distinctiveness
through "secondary meaning." Id. See supra note 42. The court further noted that under Fourth Cir-
cuit precedent, intentional and direct copying of a trademark results in a rebuttable presumption that
the mark is distinctive regardless of its descriptive character. Id. at 371; see also Larsen, 151 F.3d at
148-49. The Fourth Circuit found that SBM's mark was intentionally copied by the Companies and
held that the Companies had failed to rebut the presumption of distinctiveness under this standard.
Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 371-72.
211. See Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 363-64.
212. Id. at 363 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000)).
213. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127)).
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equivalent to Congress's power to "regulate Commerce with foreign na-
tions, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. ' 214 Conse-
quently, the court established that "commerce" under the Act includes "all
the explicitly identified variants of interstate commerce [and] foreign trade
.... "215 Thus, under the requirements of the Act, SBM's mark would be
protected only upon a showing that it had been "used or displayed in the
sale or advertising of services and the services [were] rendered" in inter-
state commerce or in commerce with foreign nations.
216
The court next turned to the Companies' argument that SBM had no
protectable interest in the "Casino de Monte Carlo" mark. The Companies
asserted that the actual gambling services that SBM's mark represented
were not rendered in interstate commerce in the United States and that
merely advertising and booking reservations under the mark did not consti-
tute sufficient "use in commerce. ' 217 The court responded by pointing out
that while advertising in the United States was necessary, rendering ser-
vices in interstate commerce in the United States was not the only activity
that would satisfy the second requirement of the Act.218 The court rea-
soned that "[s]ince the nineteenth century, it has been well established that
the Commerce Clause reaches to foreign trade. And, for the same length
of time, the Supreme Court has defined foreign trade as trade between
subjects of the United States and subjects of a foreign nation."2 9 The
court further noted that such foreign trade is not limited to the interchange
of commodities, but also encompasses commercial intercourse in the form
of service transactions.220 Therefore, the court found that while SBM's ad-
vertising in the United States on its own was not "use in commerce," such
promotion coupled with the fact that Americans purchased casino services
from a foreign seller satisfied both requirements of the Lanham Act.22 '
The Companies attempted a twofold rebuttal. First, the Companies
argued that any trade at the casino by United States citizens did not satisfy
the Act because "it did not occur in the United States. ' 222 The court re-
sponded by pointing out that past rulings from the Supreme Court have
specifically held that Congress's power over the subject of foreign trade
"must be exercised wherever the subject exists . . . . The locality of the
[trade] can have nothing to do with the power. ' 223 Foreign trade, accord-
ing to the court, was defined "not by where the trade occurs, but by the
214. Id. at 364 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
215. Id.
216. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
217. Id. at 365-66.
218. Id.
219. Id. (quoting In re Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96 (1879)).
220. Id. (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824); United States v. Am. Bldg.
Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 283 (1975)).
221. Id. at 366.
222. Id.
223. Id. (quoting United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1865) (emphasis added in
original)).
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characteristics of the parties who engage in the trade .... ",224 Therefore, it
was of no consequence to the court that the trade occurred on foreign soil
so long as the trade involved commercial intercourse between United
States citizens and a foreign entity.
225
Second, the Companies argued that even if Congress could regulate
transactions abroad between citizens of the United States and foreign enti-
ties, the particular transactions at issue were not foreign trade because they
did not have "a substantial effect on foreign trade," and the casino's clien-
tele consisted of only the very wealthy.226 In response, the court flatly
stated that "[t]he substantial effects test is not implicated here at all."'22 7
The court explained that the substantial effects test was created by the Su-
preme Court to prevent encroachment on a state's police power by restrict-
ing congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to those activities
that "substantially affect interstate commerce. 2 28 The court noted that
while Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce "may be restricted
by considerations of federalism and state sovereignty[,] [i]t has never been
suggested that Congress' [sic] power to regulate foreign commerce could be
so limited. '229 According to the court, the rationale that gave rise to the
substantial effects test was "therefore absent from analysis of congressional
legislation purporting to regulate foreign commerce. "230
The Companies argued finally that in Buti, the Second Circuit had es-
tablished that United States trademark protection cannot extend to ser-
vices rendered solely in a foreign country and that the Fourth Circuit
should follow that precedent.231 The court rejected the Companies' argu-
ment on two grounds. First, the court reasoned that Buti involved a "piv-
otal concession" in which the foreign party seeking protection for its
service mark conceded that the services it sold "form[ed] no part of the
trade between [the foreign country] and the United States. 2 32 Second, the
court pointed out that, regardless of such concession, the facts of the case
did not indicate that the foreign company satisfied any of the requirements
of the Act's "use in commerce" definition, as it was clearly established that
224. Id.
225. Id. at 368. n.5.
226. Id. at 366.
227. Id. at 368.
228. Id. at 368-69 (citing United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000)) (emphasis
added).
229. Id. at 368 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 448 n.13 (1979)) (empha-
sis added).
230. Id. The court further noted that the substantial effects test only limits congressional author-
ity with respect to one of the three broad categories of Congress's Commerce Clause power. Id. Con-
gress may regulate the use of channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, and activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Id. Because "the regulated ac-
tivity at issue is itself commercial intercourse (i.e., the trademarks are an instrumentality of commercial
intercourse and the provision of the services necessarily involves both channels of and instrumentalities
of that commercial intercourse)," it falls into the first two categories of activity that Congress may
regulate and does not implicate the substantial effects test. Id. at 369.
231. Id. (citing Buti v. Perosa, 139 F.3d 98, 98 (2d Cir. 1998)).
232. Id. (quoting Buti, 139 F.3d at 103).
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the company "undertook no 'formal advertising or public relations cam-
paign [aimed at United States citizens].' ,,233 Recognizing no such conces-
sion by SBM in the present case, and noting that SBM had "quite clearly
.. .used the mark in its foreign trade, '234 the court concluded that "the
services SBM renders under the 'Casino de Monte Carlo' mark to citizens
of the United States are services rendered in commerce, and the 'use in
commerce' requirement that the Lanham Act sets forth for the mark's pro-
tectability is satisfied.
235
Having found the mark protectable, the court next reviewed the dis-
trict court's finding that the Companies used a similar mark in a manner
that was likely to confuse consumers.236 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that
the Companies' "use of pictures and renderings of the actual Casino de
Monte Carlo, and the websites implying that they provided online gam-
bling as an alternative to their non-existent Monte Carlo-based casino all
support the conclusion that ordinary consumers would be confused.
237
Thus, the court declared that the district court correctly granted summary
judgment in favor of SBM on its trademark infringement claim under sec-
tion 43(a) of the Lanham Act.238
B. The Dissent
Judge Motz issued an emphatic dissent that centered not on disagree-
ment with the majority's reading of the Lanham Act's definition of "use in
commerce," nor on distaste for the majority's legal reasoning, but rather on
the majority's departure from precedent and the consequences of the deci-
sion.239 The dissent agreed that SBM had satisfied the first element of the
"use in commerce" requirement of the Lanham Act by using its mark in
extensive advertising and promotions in New York, but believed that any
finding that the services had been rendered in commerce was contrary to
the reasoning of "every court to address [the] issue."
24 °
According to the dissent, "no court, administrative agency, or trea-
tise '24 1 had ever adopted the theory that "use of a foreign trademark in
connection with goods and services sold only in a foreign country by a for-
eign entity ... constitute[s] 'use of the mark' in United States commerce
233. Id. (quoting Buti, 139 F.3d at 100) (alteration in original).
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 382.
237. Id.
238. Id. The Companies did not challenge the district court's ruling on SBM's cybersquatting
claim under the ACPA, but did challenge the domain name transfer as being an overbroad remedy. Id.
Addressing the Companies' challenge, the court noted that the ACPA expressly provides for domain
name transfer as a feasible remedy and thus held that the district court's award was proper. Id.
239. See id. at 383-89 (Motz, J., dissenting).
240. Id. at 385.
241. Id. at 384.
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sufficient to merit protection under the Lanham Act. '24 2 Judge Motz of-
fered several decisions from various federal courts of appeals that she be-
lieved had rejected the majority's exact finding that "use of a foreign mark
in a foreign country somehow grants the foreign mark holder [rights in a
mark] in the United States. '2 43 Judge Motz reasoned that trademark rights
could be afforded to SBM only upon a showing that gambling services ren-
dered under the mark were rendered in the United States.244 This require-
ment, she noted, could not be circumvented by merely showing that United
States citizens availed themselves of the services when the services were
rendered solely in a foreign country.245
Judge Motz also offered, as support for her opinion, several decisions
from the TTAB, each holding that a "right in a trademark in the United
States depends on... use in the United States and is not affected by... use
in a foreign country. '2 46 Judge Motz found these decisions to bear "great
weight '247 on the issue before the Fourth Circuit, which fueled her belief
that "because SBM has not rendered its casino services in the United
States, it has not satisfied the statutory 'use in commerce' requirement in a
manner sufficient to merit protection under the Lanham Act. ' 248 The ma-
jority's failure to cite "a single case in which a court has accorded trade-
mark rights to a foreign mark holder absent a showing of use [of the mark]
in the United States '2 49 led Judge Motz to conclude that "[a]dvertising in
the United States alone, no matter how extensive, does not suffice to
demonstrate the necessary use in the United States '2 50 to give rise to pro-
tection under the Lanham Act.
Judge Motz's dissent also focused on the "potential consequences of
adoption of the majority's rule.21 5 1 The adoption of such a rule, she noted,
would "wreak havoc ' 12 2 over United States trademark law by allowing
"any [foreign] entity that uses a foreign mark to advertise and sell its goods
or services to United States citizens in a foreign country [to] be eligible for
trademark protection under United States law. 2 53 Such a rule would force
242. Id. at 385.
243. Id. (citing Buti v. Perosa, 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998); Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d
1565, 1567-69 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Shinohara Shoji Kabushiki Kaisha, 754 F.2d 591,
599 (5th Cir. 1985)).
244. Id. at 383.
245. Id. at 386 n.4.
246. Id. at 386 (quoting Sterling Drug Inc. v. Knoll A.-G. Chemische Fabriken, 159 U.S.P.Q. 628,
630 (1968)). See also Techex, Ltd. v. Dvorkovitz, 220 U.S.P.Q. 81, 83 (1983); Mother's Rests. Inc. v.
Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 1046, 1048 (1983); Stagecoach Props., Inc. v. Wells Fargo &
Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. 341, 349 (1978).
247. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 386. Although the decisions of the YlAB are not binding on the
courts of appeals, they have long been found to be entitled to great weight from the courts when
considering issues of trademark protection in the United States. See Buti, 139 F.3d at 105; In re Dr.
Pepper Co., 836 F.2d 508, 510 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
248. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 383-84.
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a potential trademark user to "scour the globe ' 25 4 to determine whether
some foreign entity was using a similar mark that may one day be used
against it in a trademark infringement action.255 At the same time, the
majority's holding would inject a "foreign influenza 2156 into the United
States by instantly creating trademark rights in a foreign mark when a
United States citizen purchased goods or services abroad and then re-
turned home.2 57 Ultimately concerned with the additional burden imposed
on potential United States trademark users and the departure from prece-
dent that had prevented such a burden, Judge Motz respectfully refused to
give her support to the majority.2
V. ANALYSIS
When the Fourth Circuit handed down International Bancorp, it be-
came the first federal circuit court to grant trademark protection to a for-
eign mark holder under United States law based expressly on a finding of
foreign commerce.2 5 9 The majority spent many pages of the decision at-
tempting to justify its stance in light of the dissent's contention that the
opinion was a vast departure from a body of precedent that had already
solidified an approach to determining trademark rights for foreign entities.
Underlying the dispute between the two sides are two starkly contrasting
interpretations of the "use in commerce" requirement set forth in the Lan-
ham Act.
The majority's approach hinges on careful separation of the two dis-
tinct elements of the definition. "Use in commerce" for service marks is
satisfied when (1) the mark is "used" by displaying it in the sale or advertis-
ing of services in the United States, and (2) the services are rendered "in
commerce" which may be lawfully regulated by Congress, including com-
merce between the United States and foreign nations. 6° Under this view,
"use" of the service mark through substantial advertising in the United
States is sufficient to establish the presence of a foreign business or trade in
this country, and commerce between the United States and foreign nations
is regulable "commerce" no matter whether the flow of such commerce
ends in the United States or in the foreign country.
The dissent agreed that both elements of the definition must be met
before trademark protection will be afforded to a foreign entity, but essen-
tially conflated the two elements of the definition by requiring both to oc-
cur in the United States. Thus, according to the dissent, advertising or
promotion in the United States may establish "use," but such use is insuffi-
cient to establish the presence of a foreign business in the United States
254. Id. at 389.
255. Id. at 388.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 383.
259. Thomas L. Casagrande, What Must a Foreign Service Mark Holder Do To Create and Main-
tain Trademark Rights in the United States?, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1354, 1368 (2003) (emphasis added).
260. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 359-98.
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when it is unaccompanied by services rendered in the United States. 261
Under this approach, "commerce" between the United States and foreign
nations may be recognized as commerce that may be lawfully regulated by
Congress, but services that are rendered solely in a foreign country, regard-
less of advertising in the United States, will never give rise to "use in
commerce."
The majority's sole reliance on Supreme Court precedent emphasizing
the broad reach of Congress's power over foreign commerce seems like a
rebellious approach when answering a question that has supposedly been
answered repeatedly by various courts of appeals and the TrAB over the
years. Thus, the majority's reasoning in International Bancorp gives rise to
two questions: (1) was the Fourth Circuit justified in its refusal to apply this
existing body of precedent to the instant case, and (2) is the decision really
a departure, as the dissent suggests, from the precedent? As will be shown
below, the International Bancorp decision cannot be viewed as a departure
from the existing body of precedent from the federal courts of appeals, as
none of those courts have been confronted with the opportunity to fully
define the scope of the "use in commerce" requirement and therefore
could not adequately guide the Fourth Circuit in its ruling. International
Bancorp does, however, stand in stark contrast to decisions from the
TTAB. The Board has firmly established its stance as opposite that of the
Fourth Circuit. Apparently, though, the Fourth Circuit's dismissal of
TTAB precedent is justified in the eyes of the Supreme Court, judging by
its refusal to grant certiorari in the case.
A. Federal Courts of Appeals Decisions
The dissent asserted as guiding precedent the Federal Circuit's holding
in Imperial Tobacco that "use" of a service mark in a foreign country can-
not give rise to protectable rights in the United States.262 However, view-
ing the Imperial Tobacco decision in the context in which it was decided
shows that the majority in the instant case was justified in dismissing it as
inapplicable precedent. The court's focus in Imperial Tobacco was aimed
solely at the foreign mark holder's claim that its advertisements alone in the
United States established trademark rights because it allegedly was known
in the United States.263 The foreign mark holder made no assertion that it
engaged in any foreign commerce with the United States and the court
made no mention of such qualifying commerce. 64 Therefore, the Federal
Circuit did not need to define what type of commercial intercourse be-
tween nations would sustain a finding of "use in commerce," but only had
occasion to determine whether advertising in the United States alone
261. "SBM did not 'use' its mark in commerce because it did not 'use' the mark in the United
States." Id. at 383 (Motz, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 387.
263. Imperial Tobacco Ltd. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 899 F.2d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
264. See id. at 1575-83.
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would satisfy the requirement. Presented with no claim of qualifying com-
merce of any type, the court stated that "use" means "use... in the United
States.'265 The Federal Circuit made no effort in the opinion to clarify its
reasoning behind the application of the "use in commerce" requirement,
presumably because it had no occasion to address the full scope of the
phrase. Whatever the court's intentions, it is clear that a holding that stems
from a claim based on advertising alone could not serve as a sufficient
guide for the Fourth Circuit when it was faced with advertising and foreign
intercourse.
Furthermore, it cannot be said that the decision in the instant case is a
departure from the holding in Imperial Tobacco. The majority's interpreta-
tion of the "use in commerce" requirement makes clear that while advertis-
ing in the United States is a necessary element, advertising alone will not
give rise to trademark rights absent rendering the services in regulable
commerce. 266 Thus, as far as its ruling extends to advertising, the major-
ity's interpretation in International Bancorp comports with the holding of
the Federal Circuit. One could reasonably assume that the Fourth Circuit,
if confronted with the same facts as in Imperial Tobacco, would reach the
same outcome as the Federal Circuit.
The dissent in the instant case also offered as guiding precedent the
Federal Circuit's holding in Person's Co. v. Christman267 that exclusive for-
eign "use" cannot serve as a basis for United States trademark rights.268
However, the factual scenario underlying Person's makes clear, once again,
that the majority in the instant case was justified in dismissing this holding
as irrelevant to the International Bancorp proceedings. In Person's, the
Federal Circuit was faced with a foreign claimant's assertion that his adver-
tising, manufacture, and sale of goods confined exclusively to Japan was
sufficient "use in commerce" to allow rights in the United States.2 69 Again,
the Federal Circuit had no occasion to establish guidelines for determining
what type of foreign commercial intercourse will satisfy the "use in com-
merce" requirement, as it was not presented with any allegation of interac-
tion between the foreign company and the United States or its citizens.
265. Id. at 1579. Further, it is important to note that the Imperial Tobacco decision involved a
mark "used" in connection with goods. Under the Lanham Act, mere advertising of a mark employed
in the sale of goods is insufficient to give rise to trademark rights. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). The mark
must be affixed to the goods which then enter the flow of commerce. Id. Therefore, in any situation
involving goods, advertising is never considered in determining "use in commerce."
266. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 381. The majority emphasizes that "it is not enough for a mark
owner to engage in qualifying commerce to create rights in his mark, [nor is it] enough for a mark
owner to use or display the mark in the advertising or sale of services to create rights in his mark ....
Rather, a mark owner must both engage in qualifying commerce and use or display its mark in the sale
or advertising of theses services to the consumers that engage in that qualifying commerce." Id. (em-
phasis in original).
267. Person's Co. v. Christman, 900 F.2d 1565, 1567-68 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (discussed supra text
accompanying notes 188-94).
268. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 385.
269. See Person's, 900 F.2d at 1567-68 (discussed supra text accompanying notes 188-94). Al-
though it may sound like an absurd argument, it was actually a "last resort" for the claimant in an effort
to protect his mark in the United States. Supra text accompanying note 190.
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Furthermore, the Federal Circuit was forced to determine the effect of ad-
vertising as it relates to the "use in commerce" requirement. All advertis-
ing activity in Person's took place in Japan. Therefore, the Federal
Circuit's opinion barring exclusive foreign use as a catalyst for United
States rights could not serve as a guide for the Fourth Circuit when faced
with extensive United States advertising and commercial intercourse be-
tween nations. Any attempt to apply the Person's ruling to the facts of
International Bancorp gives the Federal Circuit's holding more credit than
it is due.
Given the scenario before the Federal Circuit in Person's, it cannot be
said that the International Bancorp decision is necessarily a departure from
that holding. The Person's decision was the result of a logical analysis by a
court faced with nothing but exclusive foreign activity. When viewed
through the eyes of the majority or the dissent in the instant case, the out-
come of Person's would be the same, as both sides require that at least
some activity, be it advertising or rendering of services, take place in the
United States.
The dissenting judge in International Bancorp also believed that the
Second Circuit's opinion in Buti supports the contention that "promotional
activities in the United States [are] insufficient to establish 'use in com-
merce' of the ...name absent proof that [the owner] offered any ...
services in United States commerce."27 The dissenting opinion is well-
founded. However, the Buti case involved a pivotal concession by the for-
eign claimant that the services he offered in Italy formed no part of foreign
commerce between the United States and Italy.27' Because of this conces-
sion, the majority in the instant case was justified in its refusal to recognize
the case as applicable precedent, just as it was with Imperial Tobacco and
Person's. The case stands only for the proposition that advertising alone in
the United States cannot support a finding of "use in commerce" because
the court's focus was aimed only at determining whether advertising met
the requirement.272 The Second Circuit had no cause to determine whether
qualifying foreign commerce was present and made no mention of such
commerce after the concession was made. Therefore, while the dissent's
proposal is correct, it serves only to highlight one element of the "use in
commerce" requirement for a service mark.273 Thus, the Buti decision, like
Imperial Tobacco and Person's, could not provide sufficient guidance for
the Fourth Circuit, as it does not address the full scope of the "use in com-
merce" requirement.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion in International Bancorp cannot be
viewed as contrary to the holding in Buti. As far as the Buti decision is
270. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 390-91 (some internal quotation marks omitted).
271. Buti v. Perosa, 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 1998).
272. Id. ("These admissions . ..have dramatically narrowed the issue to be decided in this
appeal.").
273. Remember, for a service mark to meet the "use in commerce" requirement, the mark must
be used in advertising and the services must be rendered in commerce. 15 U.S.C. §1127 (2000).
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restricted to the determination that mere United States advertising cannot
support a finding of "use in commerce," it comports with the finding of the
Fourth Circuit. As mentioned earlier, both the majority and the dissent in
the instant case would require, in the context of a service mark, that adver-
tising must take place in the United States. Thus, the outcome of the Buti
case most likely would be the same if brought before the Fourth Circuit. 7 '
Arguably, International Bancorp can be viewed as merely a fitting ad-
dition to the existing body of precedent from the courts of appeals applying
the "use in commerce" requirement, rather than a departure from past
holdings. The Fourth Circuit was simply the first court to be presented
with the opportunity to define the full scope of the definition, as it has been
the only one thus far to face claims of both United States advertising and
the possible existence of foreign commerce. Therefore, factual underpin-
nings of International Bancorp may justify the Fourth Circuit's refusal to
rely upon federal courts of appeals precedent. However, the majority's re-
fusal to recognize prior decisions from the TTAB is not as firmly sup-
ported, as International Bancorp creates direct conflict between the Fourth
Circuit and the TTAB with respect to the interpretation of the "use in com-
merce" requirement.
B. TTAB Decisions
Of the decisions offered by the dissent in opposition to the Interna-
tional Bancorp decision, two from the TTAB provide support for the dis-
sent's assertion that advertising in the United States, coupled with foreign
commerce that takes place solely on foreign soil, cannot give rise to "use in
commerce" of a service mark.275 The first of these decisions is Mother's
Restaurants Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc.2 76 There, the TTAB ad-
dressed the "use in commerce" issue in the face of a claim that Canadian
advertisements reaching into the United States, combined with services
rendered in Canada to United States citizens, satisfied the "use in com-
merce" requirement.277 The Board seemingly gave no weight to the fact
that American citizens arguably entered into the stream of foreign com-
merce, but rather focused its energies on the advertising campaign alone.
274. The Buti holding, that advertising in the United States could not constitute "use" of the mark
within the meaning of the Lanham Act, is also distinguishable on other grounds. The court based its
holding on language from the Southern District of New York that stated that "[m]ere advertisement of
a product by use of a mark would not constitute . . . trademark use .... [T]rademark rights develop
when goods bearing the mark are placed in the market .... " Buti, 139 F.3d at 103 (quoting Cullman
Ventures, Inc. v. Columbian Art Works, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 96, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (emphasis added)).
Apparently, the court relied on an application of the definition of "use" for marks related to goods to
determine that advertising of a service mark would not give rise to "use." The definition of "use in
commerce" for service marks clearly provides that advertising may serve to establish at least some form
of "use," while the requirement for goods makes no mention of the effect of advertising. See supra text
accompanying note 107.
275. See Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 392.
276. Mother's Rests. Inc. v. Mother's Other Kitchen, Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. 1046 (1983) (discussed
supra text accompanying notes 162-68).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 162-68.
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The reasoning behind the Board's dismissal of the possible foreign com-
merce argument is apparent in its holding that "prior use and advertising of
a mark in connection with goods or services marketed in a foreign country
(whether [the] advertising occurs inside or outside the United States) cre-
ates no ... rights in [the] mark in the United States .... "278 The Board
focused only on the advertising, not because of a concession or failure by
the plaintiff to raise the issue, but rather because it deemed services offered
only in a foreign country to be irrelevant to its determination. Thus, the
TTAB's position in Mother's Restaurants seems to be in direct conflict with
the Fourth Circuit's assertion that foreign commerce may exist between
nations even if the commerce occurs on foreign soil. 79
The Board reinforced its position in Linville v. Rivard,"' in which a
Canadian beauty salon owner claimed that Canadian-based radio, televi-
sion, and newspaper advertisements that reached into the United States
coupled with services rendered to United States citizens in Canada satisfied
the "use in commerce" requirement.281 In response, the Board made clear
its stance on what constitutes foreign commerce when it stated that "[t]he
mere fact that residents of the United States have availed themselves of
respondent's services while in Canada does not constitute technical trade-
mark use of [the] service mark .... "282 Thus, in Linville, the TTAB issued
its second opinion addressing the "use in commerce" requirement that now
stands in stark contrast to the decision in International Bancorp.
The majority in the instant case explained its refusal to follow the
TTAB's lead by noting that even though decisions from the TTAB are enti-
tled to great weight, "great weight.., does not mean obeisance ... particu-
larly in the face of overwhelmingly clear [Lanham Act] language" that
indicates Congress's intent to govern foreign commerce with the United
States on foreign soil.2 83 Thus, even in light of the dissent's criticism, the
majority felt its departure from TTAB precedent was justified. Appar-
ently, the Supreme Court agreed with the majority, as indicated by its re-
fusal to grant certiorari on the case. The International Bancorp decision is
now binding precedent for the Fourth Circuit and guiding precedent for the
others. However, the Supreme Court's inaction will undoubtedly be
viewed as a mistake in hindsight, as the Fourth Circuit decision creates sev-
eral cracks in the surface of trademark regulation that, left unaddressed,
will surely widen into canyons.
278. Mother's Rests., 218 U.S.P.Q. at 1048 (emphasis added).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 260-61.
280. Linville v. Ravard, 26 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1508 (1993) (discussed supra text accompanying notes
169-78).
281. Id.
282. Id. at 1512.
283. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329
F.3d 359, 379 (4th Cir. 2003).
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C. Effects of the International Bancorp Decision
One of the most notable consequences of the decision is that it creates
a potential discrepancy in trademark law with respect to Internet domain
name use that may very well serve to diminish the benefits of the trade-
mark registration system by unintentionally providing protection to unre-
gistered mark holders engaging in foreign commerce. A full understanding
of this effect first requires a brief mention of two of the most important
incentives to trademark registration.
First, once a trademark is registered in the United States with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO), the owner is essen-
tially provided with a nationwide presumption that his rights in that mark
are superior to all who subsequently attempt to employ a similar mark.284
Second, upon registration the mark is entered into a database which can be
searched by those seeking to employ a particular trademark, thus providing
notice of its current use by another and warning all subsequent users that
their rights may be quashed if the registered user chooses to use his mark
in the same geographical area.285 The owner of an unregistered mark is
afforded no such luxury. In the event a similar mark is subsequently used
by another, the unregistered mark owner always runs the risk of having his
trademark rights confined to the area where he has actually used his mark
in conjunction with an established business or trade. 86
Against this background, the effect of International Bancorp on the
advantages of trademark registration may best be explained by the follow-
ing illustration. Suppose that a French massage therapist wishes to estab-
lish recognition of his business in the United States and begins an
advertising campaign in Iowa. He spends $100,000 placing billboard ads
throughout the state bearing his service mark "Massage. 287 He opens an
office in Des Moines, employing citizens of Iowa, where the citizens of that
state can book reservations for a personal massage in France. The French
therapist never registers his trademark with the USPTO. The Iowa adver-
tising campaign and reservations office ultimately result in approximately
fifty percent of the French therapist's customers being citizens of Iowa who
travel to France for massages.
Now suppose that five years later a California massage therapist starts
his business under the service mark "Massage" in California and advertises
in California, Nevada, and Utah, which results in clientele from each state.
The California therapist searches the USPTO database and finds no record
of another's use of the mark. The Californian does not register his trade-
mark either. Under the International Bancorp standard, both parties are
now protected under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act because they have
284. JANE C. GINSBURG, JESSICA LITMAN & MARY L. KEVLIN, TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COM-
PETITION LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 221 (3d ed. 2001).
285. Id.
286. See United Drug v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1918).
287. Assume that the mark owner will establish its distinctiveness, over time, through secondary
meaning.
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"used" their marks through advertising in the United States and have ren-
dered their services in commerce that may be lawfully regulated by Con-
gress. Due to the founding trademark principles set forth by the Supreme
Court in United Drug, both service marks may coexist, even though they
are unregistered, so long as their geographical reaches do not overlap. In
the event of overlap, the party who used it first in the disputed area will win
rights to the mark in that area.
Now suppose that the French therapist has proceeded in the same
manner, but five years later the California massage therapist spends a con-
siderable amount of money to create a website devoted to explaining es-
sential massage techniques and launches the site under the domain name
"Massage.com." The California therapist again searches the USPTO
database and finds no record of another's use of the mark. He then spends
$100,000 to place billboard ads in California, Nevada, and Utah to adver-
tise his website. Again, neither party has attempted to register his service
mark. The global reach of the Internet leads to the French therapist's dis-
covery of the California website, at which time he attempts to enjoin the
Californian from using "Massage.com" on the ground that it is confusingly
similar to his own mark. Because the use of a domain name extends glob-
ally and cannot be restricted territorially, the International Bancorp deci-
sion gives the French mark owner, whose ties to the United States consist
solely of advertising and promotions, the ability to effectively halt the Cali-
fornian's use of the mark as a domain name. Even though the Frenchman
has not registered his mark in the United States and has no national pre-
sumption of superior rights, he is essentially afforded the equivalent be-
cause the Californian's use cannot be restricted to a particular area
pursuant to the United Drug principle. The Frenchman's first use makes
him the rightful owner regardless of whether he has registered his mark.
This illustration should seem familiar because it is nearly identical to
the scenario in International Bancorp, and it brings to light other problems
created by the decision. First, the decision opens a doorway to inconsistent
applications of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. As illustrated, a claim
involving unregistered trademarks incorporated in domain names may po-
tentially yield the opposite result from a claim involving non-Internet use
of an unregistered mark, even though both are based on the same factual
underpinnings. The Supreme Court has emphasized that federal entities
"must speak with one voice when regulating commercial relations with for-
eign [nations]." '288 Allowing unequal application of federal law regarding
trademarks surely undermines this principle.
Second, by increasing the scope of protection afforded an unregistered
foreign trademark in the United States, the International Bancorp decision
288. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of L.A., 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979). See also supra text accompany-
ing notes 136-143.
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forces those wishing to invest in and adopt a mark to "scour the globe
28 9
in order to determine the existence of any other similar mark that may one
day preempt their rights. Because unregistered marks are not documented
in a central location with the USPTO, the only way for a potential user to
know of another similar mark is through its recognition in the marketplace.
The International Bancorp decision does require advertising in the United
States in order to gain protection. However, absent nationwide advertising
of the foreign mark, this requirement does little to remedy the problem
where the mark holders are largely geographically separated. In the In-
ternet context described above, the broader scope of protection for an un-
registered foreign mark essentially serves to place the foreign mark's
protection on equal footing as that of a registered mark without equally
affording a potential user of a similar mark a mechanism to insure against
future termination of his rights. The obvious result of such a system will be
a flood of litigation over numerous questions of use, location, rights, and
ownership. If the goal of trademark protection is to avoid the likelihood of
confusion, International Bancorp certainly is not a step towards that end.
Finally, the International Bancorp decision arguably will serve to un-
settle the USPTO's framework for awarding trademark registration under
the Lanham Act. As noted above, the TIAB serves as the administrative
tribunal charged with resolving contests of trademark ownership that often
arise in registration proceedings.29 ° Whether a party brings suit contesting
the validity of another's current registration or whether a party brings suit
contesting the USPTO's denial of registration for a mark, the TTAB serves
as the USPTO's initial mechanism for deciding the issue. If a party is dis-
satisfied with the ruling of the TTAB, then an appeal is proper to the Fed-
eral Circuit Court of Appeals.291
Suppose, now, that a foreign service mark holder seeks registration in
the United States and is denied because his services are rendered to United
States citizens in a foreign country, even though he advertises extensively
in the United States. Suppose further that his appeal to the YTAB is un-
successful on the same grounds, as evidently the TTAB's stance is that a
foreign mark holder's services must be offered in the United States. If the
foreign service mark holder appeals, and the court of appeals follows Inter-
national Bancorp (or if the appeal is taken by the Fourth Circuit), then
arguably the mark holder will be eligible for federal registration of his ser-
vice mark.
The problem lies in the realization that any decision of the TTAB
overturned in the wake of International Bancorp must be viewed as tainted
by the fact that the Fourth Circuit's decision was rendered in the context of
289. "Scour the globe" is the colorful phrase used by the dissent to describe the potential conse-
quences of the International Bancorp decision. Int'l Bancorp, LLC v. Societe des Bains de Mer et du
Cercle des Etrangers a Monaco, 329 F.3d 359, 388 (4th Cir. 2003) (Motz, J., dissenting).
290. Supra text accompanying note 144.
291. MCCARTHY, supra note 144, § 21:4. Section 1071(b) of the Lanham Act allows appeals of
T[AB decisions to be taken to the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
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litigation between two unregistered trademarks. Thus, the TTAB, which
was created solely to police the separate issue of trademark registration,
and whose authority and expertise on the subject has developed over forty-
seven years of litigation, will have its decision overturned based on a hold-
ing issued in a case of first impression 29 2 by the Fourth Circuit, which re-
fused to even recognize TTAB precedent. Was this the intent of Congress
when it drafted the Lanham Act? Unfortunately, only the Supreme Court
can answer that question, but it chose not to in International Bancorp.
VI. CONCLUSION
The reasoning of the Fourth Circuit in International Bancorp appears
sound. After all, it takes no stretch of the imagination to see that the deci-
sion is simply an application of two distinct elements of the statutory defini-
tion of "use in commerce" that recognizes foreign commerce as satisfaction
of its terms. Further support from Supreme Court precedent permitting
such foreign commerce to occur outside the United States makes the opin-
ion even more credible, as indicated by the Supreme Court's denial of cer-
tiorari. As sound as the opinion is, however, its status now as persuasive
authority could lead to pandemonium in the world of trademark law.
Hopefully, courts will rely sparingly on the opinion as guiding precedent,
thus rendering its practical effects trivial. However, widespread acceptance
of the decision as persuasive authority could prove to be disastrous to the
foundations of trademark law, as mark holders from around the world
would have a tool for acquiring United States rights over an American user
by establishing only a minimal presence in the United States. The result
could undoubtedly be a flood of litigation in federal district courts and the
courts of appeals, as TTAB decisions might now readily be discredited by
International Bancorp. While the effects of the decision ultimately will de-
pend on the actions of the federal district courts and courts of appeals, one
thing is certain: the Supreme Court will have an opportunity to address this
issue again-maybe sooner rather than later. When next petitioned, how-
ever, the Court will not have the luxury of denying certiorari, as the sanc-
tity of United States trademark law may very well lie in its hands.
292. Int'l Bancorp, 329 F.3d at 363 ("This circuit has never directly addressed the scope of the
term 'commerce' within the Lanham Act.").
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